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I.

Introduction

In 2018, almost 3,500 people filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission alleging religious-based discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (the (Act).1 The Act was enacted to prevent workplace discrimination against
employees and applicants based on a variety of classifications including religion, sex, and race.
A vitally important piece of legislation, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was designed to
promote equality in the workplace.2 It imposes an affirmative duty on employers to not
discriminate against employees and potential employees.3 Further, if a conflict between an
employee’s religious observance or practice arises and work requirements, the employer has an
affirmative duty to reasonably accommodate, once it has been notified of such conflict.4
However, the federal circuit courts do not agree on what constitutes a reasonable
accommodation.
Since its enactment, federal courts have disagreed about this standard. A recent decision by
the Eleventh Circuit deepened a divide among circuit courts as to the burden imposed on
employers in religious discrimination cases.5 The Supreme Court has decided several Title VII
cases, but it has not defined what constitutes a reasonable accommodation, instead providing

1

Religion-Based Charges (Charges filed with EEOC), U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/religion.cfm (last visited November 9, 2019).
2
Landmark Legislation, The Civil Rights Act of 1964,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/CivilRightsAct1964.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
3
See e.g. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (2015); TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,
66 (1977); Patterson v. Walgreen Co., 727 F. App’x. 581, 584-85 (11th Cir. 2018) (cert. denied); Baker v. Home
Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 2006).
4
See e.g. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 66; Patterson, 727 F. App’x. at 584-85; Baker, 445 F.3d at 546.
5
Patterson, 727 F. App’x at 590.
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guidance on religious accommodation questions. 6 Therefore, circuit courts differ in
interpretations of the Act. Some courts have determined that, in order to reasonably
accommodate an employee’s conflict, an employer is obligated to eliminate the conflict.7 Other
courts, however, do not interpret the Act as establishing a hardline rule and instead focus on
whether the accommodations offered were “reasonable,” even if they do not eliminate the
conflict.8 Finally, some circuits have left it to the jury to determine the reasonableness.9 Thus,
the federal circuits lack a uniform standard for determining whether an employer’s attempts to
accommodate an employee’s religious conflict comply with Title VII.
This note will establish that, despite the division among circuit courts and the lack of
clarity offered by the Supreme Court, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 imposes a duty on
an employer to reasonably accommodate conflicts that arise between employment duties and its
employees’ religious practices and beliefs. Reasonable accommodations, however, do not equate
to elimination. Part II of this note gives the background on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
requirements established by the Act. Part III delves into the case law, including the Supreme
Court cases as well as the differing interpretations of the circuit courts. Finally, Part IV argues
that Title VII does not impose a duty on employers to eliminate the conflict in order to satisfy the
affirmative duty imposed by the statute. Although there is not a hardline rule to determine what
constitutes a reasonable accommodation, the ordinary meaning of the text, the legislative history,
and Supreme Court cases all fail to support the notion that an employer is required to eliminate a
conflict to comply with Title VII.

6

Hardison, 432 U.S. at 63; Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 62 (1986).
See Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., 506 F. 3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007); Baker, 445 F.3d at
546; Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996).
8
See Patterson, 727 F. App’x at 586; Sánchez-Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc., 637 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.
2012); Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375, 1378 (6th Cir. 1994).
9
See Tabura v. Kellogg USA, 880 F.3d 544, 554 (10th Cir. 2018); Sturgill v. UPS, 512 F.3d 1024, 1033 (8th Cir.
2008).
7
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II.

BACKGROUND ON TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
After a moderate Civil Rights Act failed to pass in 1957, President John F. Kennedy

proposed a more sweeping Civil Rights Act in 1963, H.R. 7152.10 Following President
Kennedy’s assassination, President Lyndon B. Johnson advocated for the adoption of the Act.11
Following a vote in favor of the bill by the House of Representatives, the bill faced staunch
opposition in the Senate, particularly from southern senators, and was debated for 60 days.12
Ultimately, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed into law on July 2, 1964.13 The Act was
challenged shortly thereafter, but the Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality.14 Almost a
decade after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972 was signed.15 This 1972 Act was created primarily to give power to the EEOC to judicially
enforce Title VII, thereby broadening the scope and power of the Act.16 The amendment also
radically expanded its coverage by reaching government workers.17

See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Nat’l Park Serv. https://www.nps.gov/articles/civil-rights-act.htm (last updated: Mar.
22, 2016).
11
See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New
Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. Ps. L. Rev. 1417, 1456 (2003); Serena J.
Hoy, Interpreting Equal Protection: Congress, the Court, and the Civil Rights Acts, 16 J. L. & Politics 381, 393
(2000); Delivering on a Dream: The House and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. House of Representatives,
https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/Civil-Rights/1964-Essay/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2019);
12
See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New
Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. Ps. L. Rev. 1417, 1471-73 (2003); Serena J.
Hoy, Interpreting Equal Protection: Congress, the Court, and the Civil Rights Acts, 16 J. L. & Politics 381, 395-96
(2000).
13
42 USCS § 2000e (2019).
14
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding the constitutionality of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 against a challenge that the statute exceeded Congress’ power to regulate commerce).
15
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 92 Pub. L 261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
16
See Kirstin Sommers Czubkowski, Equal Opportunity: Federal Employees’ Right to Sue on Title VII and Tort
Claims, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev 1841, 1845 (2013).
17
Id.
10
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Duties Created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 restricts the ability of employers to discriminate
based on various classifications. It was created to prevent race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin from inhibiting an individual’s job opportunities and growth.18 Subsequent amendments
to the Act also created methods for rectifying such discrimination.19 Following the enactment,
an employer cannot hire nor fire an employee, or discriminate in other respects, “because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”20 The Act prohibits employers from
setting terms of employment, including compensation or privileges, based on these categories.21
Furthermore, an employer cannot “limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”22
The statute now provides that religion “includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”23 This language was added
in 1972, along with other modifications, to explicitly define the term religion as Congress
intended it to be read within the statute.24 The Act, thus, does not merely forbid an employer
from treating employees differently based on religion; instead, it requires that employers take
steps to accommodate believes to the extent that work duties interfere with religious practices.

18

§ 2000e.
Id.
20
§ 2000e-2(a)(1).
21
Id.
22
§ 2000e-2(a)(2).
23
§ 2000e(j).
24
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
19
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Under the statute, a wide variety of religious discrimination cases have been litigated
across the country.25 Employees or potential employees have filed suit alleging religious
discrimination in a variety of situations, including a Seventh Day Adventist who was fired for
refusing to work past sundown on Fridays,26 a member of the Worldwide Church of God who
was forced to take time off without pay for religious observance,27 and a member of the Gospel
Fellowship Church who was offered part-time employment when he notified his employer he
could not work on Sundays.28
As noted by courts litigating these conflicts, “the purpose of the reasonable
accommodation provision is to “foster bilateral cooperation in resolving an employee’s religionwork conflict.”29 The Supreme Court noted the emphasis of the Act and history of the Act is on
eliminating discrimination.30 Thus, the goal of the Act, eliminating discrimination, guides
litigation and court interpretations surrounding alleged religious discrimination.
The origins of the duty to accommodate can be traced to Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission regulations, interpreting the Act.31 In Riley v. Bendix Corp., the court noted that the
“Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds . . . includes an
obligation on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs
of employees and prospective employees where such accommodation can be made without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”32 This view, however, was not
generally accepted, and, after the Supreme Court failed to resolve the question,33 Congress

25

§ 2000e-5.
Sturgill, 512 F.3d at1027-29.
27
Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 62-64.
28
Baker, 445 F.3d at 543-45.
29
Sturgill, 512 F.3d at 1031, citing Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 69.
30
Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 69.
31
Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1115 (5th Cir. 1972).
32
Id. quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1.
33
Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
26
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amended the 1964 Act in order to essentially codify those regulations by adopting the current
language. 34 Since that enactment, Congress has not amended the Act to define what constitutes
a reasonable accommodation or what would be considered an undue hardship.
Title VII imposes obligations on the employer as well. Because the Act creates positive
responsibilities for the employer, courts have noted that the employer has an affirmative duty to
reasonably accommodate the employee’s religious practices and observances, once the employee
notifies the employer of the need for accommodation.35 It is the responsibility of the employee
to alert the employer of a religious conflict.36 An employer can refuse to accommodate the
conflict if it can demonstrate that all available accommodations would result in an undue
hardship.37 When examining whether an employer has abided by Title VII, courts find that if an
accommodation is reasonable, the employer has satisfied the requirements.38 The inquiry stops
there.39 What constitutes reasonable is fact specific and employers, though offered guidelines,
are not limited to specific actions.40 The employer needs to consider whether the alternatives for
accommodation would disadvantage the employee in terms of opportunities, including
compensation or privileges of employment, when determining whether the accommodation
offered was reasonable.41

34

45 FR 72610 §1605.3.
Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1467.
36
Cooper, 15 F.3d at 1378 citing Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987). See also,
Sánchez-Rodriguez, 637 F.3d at 13 citing Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 133 (1st Cir. 2004). An
employee who seeks an accommodation, and sues when it is denied, bears the burden of establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination by “showing that he holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with an employment
requirement; that he has informed his employer of the conflict; and that he was discharged or disciplined for failing
to comply with the conflicting requirement.”
37
Sánchez-Rodriguez, 637 F.3d at 8. See § 2000e(j). If the employee establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to “demonstrate[] that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to
an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of
the employer’s business.”
38
Patterson, 727 F. App’x. at 586.
39
Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 68.
40
§ 1605.2(c)(2).
41
Id.
35
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The CFR outlines several categories which are considered types of reasonable
accommodations, including shift swaps, voluntary substitutes, flexible scheduling, and lateral
transfers and change of job assignments.42 The regulation notes that this is not an all-inclusive
list of what could constitute a reasonable accommodation.43 When detailing the types of
adjustments that could be considered reasonable accommodations, the regulation suggests
employers “promote an atmosphere in which substitutions are favorably regarded,” provide a
“bulletin board or other means for matching voluntary substitutes with positions for which
substitutes are needed,” “floating or optional holidays,” “staggered work hours,” and “use of
lunch time in exchange for early departure” among others.44 Neither the regulations nor the Act
provide an exhaustive list nor define what constitutes a reasonable accommodation, thereby
creating a standard that is subject to interpretation.
Although the employer has the burden to reasonably accommodate an employee’s
conflict, the employer is not required to do so if accommodations would inflict undue hardship
on it. The Act provides that an employer must accommodate the employee’s conflict unless the
accommodation would create “an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”45
Somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme Court found that requiring an employer to bear “more than
a de minimis cost” would constitute a hardship.46 The CFR, citing the Supreme Court’s
standard, notes that de minimis cost should be determined on a case-by-case basis.47 Various
factors specific to the case should be considered, including the cost of premium wages necessary
for substitutes, the size and operating cost of the employer, and the number of individuals who

42

§ 1605.2(d).
Id.
44
Id.
45
§ 2000e(j).
46
Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84.
47
§ 1605.2(e) citing Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84.
43

8

would require accommodations.48 Thus, similar to the reasonable accommodation standard, the
Act does not create a hardline rule for what constitutes an undue hardship.
While not directly addressing the definition of reasonable accommodation, the Supreme
Court has ruled on Title VII cases pertaining to religious discrimination and has clarified some
obligations imposed on both employers and employees.49 In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, the Supreme Court examined the history of Title VII to determine whether the
accommodations offered by an airline were reasonable.50 The Court stipulated that, “like the
EEOC guidelines, the statute provides no guidance for determining the degree of accommodation
that is required of an employer.”51 Hardison, a sales clerk for TWA and member of the
Worldwide Church of God, was fired after refusing to work on his Sabbath in accordance with
his church’s teachings.52 His proposed accommodations included working a four-day work week
instead of five, finding someone to swap shifts, and switching positions were not mutually
accepted.53
The Court found that the employer acted reasonably in attempting to find the employee
another job and authorizing the union steward to search for someone to switch shifts.54 While
acknowledging the alternatives suggested by the court of appeals, the Court also found that the
company could not “be faulted for having failed to work out a shift or job swap” given the
collective bargaining agreement in place.55 The Court noted that the alternatives suggested by
the lower court would require the employer to bear more than a de minimis cost because it would

48

§ 1605.2(e).
See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 63; Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 60.
50
Hardison, 432 U.S. at 71-74.
51
Id. at 74.
52
Id. at 66-69.
53
Id. at 77.
54
Id. at 77.
55
Id. at 78-79.
49
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be required to pay for an additional employee to work on Saturday or it would have to give the
employee preferential treatment over other employees.56 This would result in an undue hardship,
which Title VII specifies is not necessary.57
In Ansonia Board of Educ. v. Philbrook, the Supreme Court commented on the
congressional intention behind the statute, finding that the statute “did not impose a duty on the
employer to accommodate at all costs.”58 Philbrook was a high school teacher and member of
the Worldwide Church of God, which required members to refrain from working during
specified holy days.59 The school board allowed three missed days for religious observances but
Philbrook needed to miss six days.60 The Court found that the suggestion of taking unpaid leave
to enable the employee to observe the remaining religious holidays would eliminate the
conflict.61 The Court, however, then said that, despite eliminating the conflict, unpaid leave may
not be a reasonable accommodation if employees were allowed to take paid leave for all other
reasons, beyond religious ones.62 The Court also noted that “Senator Randolph, the sponsor of
the amendment that became [the statute], expressed his hope that accommodation would be made
with ‘flexibility’ and a desire to achieve an adjustment.”63
Philbrook does establish that, if the employer does offer a reasonable accommodation,
the duty is satisfied even if the employee would prefer a different accommodation. If, however,
an employer does not offer a reasonable accommodation, in order to satisfy the burden created
by Title VII, it must show that it did not offer a reasonable accommodation because doing so

56

Hardison, 432 U.S at 84.
Id. at 84-5.
58
Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 70.
59
Id. at 62.
60
Id. at 63.
61
Id. at 70.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 69.
57
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would have created an undue hardship. Case law has further defined an undue hardship, creating
potentially a lower bar for employers, although a hardline rule is impractical. In Hardison, the
Court found the potential for unequal treatment of employees based on religion could constitute
an undue hardship when combined with the additional costs the employer would bear to pay for a
replacement on Saturday.64 Courts have considered a wide range of factors when determining
whether an accommodation would create an undue hardship, including cost in efficiency or wage
expenditures, loss of production, and the cost of replacing a worker.65 The Supreme Court found
that the employer would bear an undue hardship if it was required to give the employee the
requested day off and incur a cost by paying for his substitute.66 In addition to considering the
hardship on the employer, courts have suggested that the hardship imposed on other employees
by the accommodation may be considered.67 Courts have noted that it is unlikely Congress
intended to allow for shift swaps or accommodations for some employees at the expense of
contractual rights of other employees.68
III.

CIRCUIT SPLIT DEFINING WHAT CONSTITUTES A REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION
Given the lack of clarity provided by Title VII in terms of what constitutes a reasonable

accommodation, courts have interpreted the statute in different ways, thereby requiring different
levels of accommodation from employers. Some courts require an employer to offer reasonable
accommodations, but do not require the employer to completely eliminate the conflict. Other
courts leave it to the jury to determine whether an accommodation should be considered

64

Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84.
Tabura, 880 F.3d at 557-58.
66
Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84.
67
Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1468.
68
Cooper, 15 F.3d at 1380.
65
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reasonable. Finally, other courts require that an employer completely eliminate the burden to
comply with the requirements of Title VII. Thus, the federal courts lack a uniform standard with
which to judge whether an employer has complied with Title VII.
A. Courts Requiring That an Employer Reasonably Accommodate a Conflict, but Not
Eliminate It
A number of federal courts have ruled that an employer is not required to eliminate a
conflict between a work obligation and an employee’s religious practice or observance in order
to comply with Title VII, but it must reasonably accommodate. Most recently, in Patterson v.
Walgreen Co., Patterson was fired after he failed to show up for work on several occasions on
his Sabbath.69 Walgreens allowed him to swap shifts, but Patterson could not always find
someone to cover his shifts, and he turned down an offer from Walgreens to switch to a position
that would decrease the likelihood he would have to work on Sabbath because Walgreens could
not guarantee he would not have to work on it.70 The court found that Walgreens offered
reasonable accommodations and did not violate Title VII.71 The Eleventh Circuit cited Walden
v. Centers For Disease Control & Prevention, in which it had previously held that “a reasonable
accommodation is one that ‘eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and
religious practices.’” However, because Walgreens offered accommodations that would have
enhanced the likelihood of avoiding the conflict, even if not completely eliminating it, it was
considered reasonable.72 The court also noted that employers are not required to give employees
a choice of accommodation or offer the preferred accommodation, so long as the accommodation

69

Patterson, 727 F. App’x at 584-85.
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 587.
70
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offered is reasonable.73 Patterson furthered the standard implemented by several other circuits:
that an employer is not required to eliminate a conflict to comply with Title VII.74
In addition to Patterson, other circuits have interpreted Title VII and Supreme Court
cases to require employers to reasonably accommodate without necessarily having to eliminate
the conflict. In Sánchez-Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc., the First Circuit found that the
combination of adjustments offered by AT&T constituted reasonable accommodations.75
Although some of the options offered by the employer were not reasonable, such as offering to
move the employee to a position with a lower salary, when looking at the combination of
options, the accommodations could be considered reasonable.76 The court found that because the
employer offered “a series of attempts by [the employer] to accommodate,” the employer had
met the standard required, even if the offered accommodations did not necessarily eliminate the
conflict.77 The court noted that the totality of circumstances and combination of approaches
should be examined; however, the court did not leave it to a jury to determine reasonableness.78
In Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., the Sixth Circuit found that the employer failed to reasonably
accommodate its employee, a Seventh Day Adventist, because it accommodated one of her
concerns but failed to accommodate her objection to working on the Sabbath.79 The court noted
an employer cannot address only one of the religious concerns, but it did not indicate that the
employer would be required to completely eliminate the conflict in order to comply with the

73

Id. at 588.
Id. at 587.
75
Sánchez-Rodriguez, 637 F.3d at 13.
76
Id. at 12-13.
77
Id.
78
Id. citing Hudson v. Western Airlines, Inc., 851 F. 2d 261, 266 (9th Cir. 1988); quoting Sturgill v. UPS, 512 F.3d
1024, 1030 (8th Cir. 2008) (“What is reasonable depends on the totality of the circumstances and therefore might, or
might not, require elimination of a particular, fact-specific conflict.”)
79
Cooper, 15 F.3d at 1379.
74
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Act.80 It found that the use of vacation days to avoid working on Sabbath could not be the only
accommodation offered, but the use of vacation days in combination in conjunction with other
solutions may be acceptable.81 Thus, these courts interpreted Title VII, as well as Hardison and
Ansonia, to require that an employer reasonably accommodate a conflict but not as having
created a hardline rule.
Some lower courts have determined that whether an employer has reasonably
accommodated a religious conflict is a question for the jury. However, these circuits have noted
that it incorrect to instruct the jury that the conflict must be eliminated in order to be considered
reasonable.82 In Sturgill v. UPS, the Eighth Circuit held that the reasonableness of an
accommodation was for the jury to determine.83 The court rejected the employee’s contention
that the employer was required to eliminate the conflict while also rejecting the employer’s
contention that it was merely required to offer a religion-neutral way for the conflict to be
minimized.84 The court held that there might be some cases where the only reasonable
accommodation requires elimination of the conflict.85 However, mirroring the logic of the
Eleventh and Sixth Circuits, the court clarified that the lower court was incorrect to instruct the
jury that “’an accommodation is reasonable if it eliminates the conflict,’” instead holding
reasonableness is a fact specific inquiry.86 The court held that, in “close cases,” the jury should
determine whether the accommodations were reasonable, given the factual aspect of the
question.87 In Tabura v. Kellogg USA, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case after the district

80

Id.
Id.
82
Tabura, 880 F.3d at 550; Sturgill, 512 F.3d at 1031.
83
Sturgill, 512 F.3d at 1033.
84
Id. at 1030.
85
Id. at 1033.
86
Id. 1030.
87
Id. at 1033.
81
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court granted the employer summary judgment, noting that determining the reasonableness of an
accommodation is a fact-specific inquiry that is made on a case-by-case basis.88 In declining to
adopt the employees’ suggested per se rule requiring the accommodation to “totally” or
“completely” eliminate the conflict, the court states that “Title VII expressly requires only that
an employer reasonably accommodate an employee’s religion.”89 The employer was not
required to guarantee the employees would never have to work on Saturday, but it would not be a
reasonable accommodation to swap them off of only some Saturday shifts.90 The court
commented that the “elimination” language used by the employees and various courts stemmed
from language used in Ansonia, noting, however, that the Ansonia court did not hold that an
accommodation would categorically be considered unreasonable if it did not eliminate the
conflict.91 Finally, finding that the reasonableness of the offered accommodations was a
disputed material fact, the court ruled it was for the jury to determine.92 Even when courts leave
it to the jury to determine the reasonableness of the accommodations offered, the jury is not
required to find that the employer eliminated the conflict to comply with the Act.
B. Courts Requiring That an Employer Eliminate a Conflict
Some circuits interpret the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Supreme Court cases to require
employers to completely eliminate the employee’s religious conflict in order to comply with the
statute’s reasonable accommodation requirement. In Baker v. Home Depot, the Second Circuit
held that an employer’s offer to move an employee’s shift later in the day was an unreasonable
accommodation as it did not eliminate the conflict.93 Baker, a member of the Gospel Fellowship

88

Tabura, 880 F.3d at 551.
Id.
90
Id. at 550.
91
Id. at 551.
92
Id. at 555.
93
Baker, 445 F.3d at 548.
89
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Church which restricted members from working on their Sabbath, refused to work on Sundays.94
The only accommodation offered by his employer was being assigned to a later Sunday shift to
enable him to attend church services in the morning.95 The court considered the accommodation
unreasonable because, although it would enable the employee to attend church, he would still be
required to work on his Sabbath, so the conflict was only partially addressed.96 Similarly, in
EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary, the Seventh Circuit held that an employer did not offer a reasonable
accommodation when its only offered solution to an employee who asked for Yom Kippur off
was to offer another day off, thereby not eliminating the conflict.97
In Opuku-Boateng v. California, the Ninth Circuit held that the employer is required to
eliminate the conflict in order for it have reasonably accommodated the religious conflict.98
When a temporary employee, a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church notified his
employer that he could not work on his Sabbath, he was denied permanent employment.99 The
court held that “where the negotiations do not produce a proposal by the employer that would
eliminate the religious conflict, the employer must either accept the employee’s proposal or
demonstrate that it would cause undue hardship were it to do so.”100 Because the court found
that, although the employer was willing to negotiate, it did not offer an accommodation, nor did
it accept the employee’s suggestion, it thereby violated Title VII.101

94

Id. at 543-44.
Id. at 545.
96
Id. at 547. See also, EEOC v. Ilona of Hung., 108 F.3d 1569, 1576 (7th Cir. 1997); Hudson, 851 F. 2d at 266
(finding that “all that is required” of an employer is providing “‘the means through which [the employee] could have
eliminated her religious conflict while preserving her employment status.’”)
97
Ilona of Hung., 108 F.3d at 1576.
98
Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1467.
99
Id. at 1465-66.
100
Id. at 1467.
101
Id. at 1469.
95

16

In Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., the court, citing Philbrook, asserted
that the Supreme Court equates a reasonable accommodation to one that eliminates the
conflict.102 In this case, the employer permitted the employee to swap shifts with other
employees, thereby enabling her to avoid the conflict altogether.103 Several circuit courts have
interpreted Title VII and the Supreme Court cases as establishing a burden on employers to
eliminate a conflict to comply with the statute.
IV.

EMPLOYERS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO ELIMINATE THE CONFLICT
Employers are required only to reasonably accommodate, not eliminate, the conflict in

order to comply with Article VII. The language of the statute itself merely demands that
employers reasonably accommodate employees’ religious conflicts. The statute does not define
accommodation; the statute, moreover, does not contain the word eliminate, nor does the
language suggest elimination and accommodation are synonymous. In addition, neither the
legislative history nor amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 equate the duty imposed on
employers to accommodate a religious conflict with a duty to eliminate that conflict. Finally, the
Supreme Court has not interpreted the Act to establish a hardline rule that an employer must
eliminate the conflict. Rather, the Court has not yet defined what a reasonable accommodation
means, nor has it created a test to determine what constitutes a reasonable accommodation.
Therefore, an employer is required to reasonably accommodate its employees’ religious
conflicts, but Title VII does not require an employer to eliminate the conflict.
A. Neither the Act nor Its Legislative History Create a Burden to Eliminate the Conflict
Title VII does not require an employer to eliminate the conflict between an employee’s
religious practice or observance and a work commitment in order to comply with the statute.

102
103

Id. at 1322.
Id. at 1323.
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The word “eliminate” does not appear in the Act as it pertains to discrimination in workplaces.104
Instead, the statute merely commands employers to reasonably accommodate its employees’
religious observances and practices, absent an undue hardship.105 The Supreme Court has noted
that, where possible, statutes should be read based on their plain meaning and ordinary
language.106 In Bond v. United States, the Court stated “in settling on a fair reading of a statute,
it is not unusual to consider the ordinary meaning of a defined term.”107 In FCC v. AT&T, Inc.,
the Court noted that “when a statute does not define a term, we typically ‘give the phrase it’s
ordinary meaning.’”108 Following a grant of summary judgment in favor Walgreens by the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida and an affirmation by the Eleventh
Circuit, the Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the United
States in the Patterson case.109 Taking up this theme, in the United States’ amicus brief for
Patterson, the United States uses various sources to define accommodate as “to make suitable,”
“adjust, ” “adapt.” 110 The United States also cites the ADA’s interpretation of the term
accommodate, which “conveys the need for effectiveness.”111 However, none of the definitions
for accommodate equate an accommodation to an elimination. Based on an ordinary reading of
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the statute, Congress did not intend to force employers to completely eliminate a conflict based
on religion. Instead, the plain meaning of the word accommodate indicates that both parties are
required to work towards a resolute and adapt to a conflict effectively. In some cases, to
effectively address a conflict, an employer may eliminate it. However, the Act does not require
an employer to eliminate a conflict to make the situation suitable for an employee.
In addition, the statute does not require an employer to allow an employee to choose the
preferred accommodation.112 Thus, the employee is not allowed to select her preferred
accommodation, which may be the one that eliminates the conflict, so long as the offered
resolution is reasonable. Other employment-based legislation that is designed to prevent
discrimination similarly embraces a flexible standard rather than a hardline rule.113 The
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was enacted to eliminate discrimination against
individuals with disabilities and provide an enforcement mechanism to prevent discrimination in
daily life.114 Similar to Title VII, the ADA requires employers to reasonably accommodate
employees.115 The ADA also does not define what constitutes a reasonable accommodation, but
instead offers examples of what can be considered a reasonable accommodation.116 This
requirement is further explained as a broad one but a requirement that does contain limitations.117
An employer does not have to modify facilities or services to create complete parity in working
conditions between disabled and non-disabled employees; the employer also does not need to
excuse past performance issues.118 Thus, parallels can be drawn between the two federal statutes
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in which Congress pointedly did not define reasonable accommodation, enabling it to be a
flexible standard.119
In addition to the statute itself, the legislative history suggests that the reasonable
accommodation standard is flexible, rather than a strict requirement that employers must
eliminate a conflict. The purpose of Title VII is to ensure workers are not discriminated in the
hiring process, and while employed, based on their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.120
As originally enacted, Title VII did not impose any accommodation requirements on employers,
instead just prohibiting religious discrimination.121 The Act is not designed to place the burden
entirely on employers.122 Instead, it is designed to promote “bilateral cooperation” between
employers and employees.123 Thus, it is an unfair reading of the Act to place the onus entirely on
the employer by forcing it to completely remove the burden. While the employer does not have
to accommodate if it would create an undue hardship, the Act does not equate eliminate and
accommodate. Instead, the employer is required to offer an effective solution to allow both the
employer and employee to adapt. Although the undue hardship provision can be viewed as a
safeguard to ensure employers do not have to accommodate at all costs, that is only the second
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step of the analysis.124 Based on the purposes of the statute, it can be inferred that Congress did
not intend to unduly hinder an employer’s ability to conduct business by forcing it to fully
eliminate every conflict that arose. In some cases, depending on an employee’s religious
practice or observance, a reasonable accommodation may result in the elimination of the conflict,
resulting in an examination of whether that accommodation results in an undue hardship.
However, just because some accommodations result in an elimination of the conflict, the Act
does not establish that as the mandatory standard for all employers. Elimination may be
sufficient to comply with Title VII, but it is not necessary.
In addition, in 1972, Congress implemented a series of modifications to the Civil Rights
Act, some of which clarified the existing Act and some of which built upon the Act to be more
inclusive. 125 Prior to the 1972 amendment, several courts interpreted Title VII to not require a
reasonable accommodation for religious beliefs.126 Senator Jennings Randolph, who proposed
the amendments, believed that “the persons on both sides of this situation, the employer and the
employee, . . . are just building upon a conviction, and hopefully, understanding and a desire to
achieve an adjustment.”127 His amendments were unanimously approved in the Senate and
approved in the House.128 Some commentators argue that this amendment created a higher
standard for employers that requires them to eliminate the conflict and avoid disadvantaging an
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employee in any way.129 When defining the term religion, Congress did not create a definitive
standard in terms of what is expected from an employer when an employee raises a religious
conflict.130 Instead, Congress set the bar at reasonable accommodation; there is nothing within
the notes from the amendment to indicate that Congress intended the bar to be any higher or
requirements to be any stricter than reasonable.131 Therefore, the Act creates merely an
obligation to reasonably accommodate, nothing further.
Finally, the CFR emphasizes only the need to reasonably accommodate a conflict; it does
not set a threshold for what constitutes reasonable. In clarifying “the obligation imposed by the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,” the CFR does not mention a duty to eliminate the conflict created by
an employee’s religious practices or observances and work obligations.132 The language in the
section does not draw a hardline and, instead, offers a variety of potential solutions to enable an
employer to reasonably accommodate.133 Absent is the implication that an employer should be
forced into action to fully ameliorate the conflict; rather, the regulations emphasize easing the
burden on employees with religious conflicts.134 The regulations even note that “[i]n a number
of cases, the securing of a substitute has been left entirely up to the individual seeking
accommodation.”135 The regulation encourages employers to facilitate such swaps.136 It
emphasizes the expectation that both the employee and employer will work to create a solution
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that enables the employee to continue to work for the employer.137 It does not establish a
threshold for reasonableness. Based on the regulations, an inference that an employer is
expected to eliminate the religious conflict is an overstatement of the burden placed on
employers.
B. The Supreme Court Did Not Create a Standard that Requires the Employer to Eliminate
the Conflict
Several circuit courts have rightly interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to mean that
an employer has an affirmative duty to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious
practices and observances once informed of them; an employer, however, is not required to
eliminate the conflict to have reasonably accommodated the conflict. Although the Supreme
Court has not definitively defined reasonable accommodation in the Title VII context, the Court
has addressed religious conflicts arising under Title VII.138 In these cases, the Court has not
established a hardline rule for when an accommodation will be considered reasonable.139 In
Ansonia, the Court found “no basis in either the statute or its legislative history for requiring an
employer to choose any particular reasonable accommodation.”140 In this case, the Court
analyzed a potential accommodation, saying it eliminated the conflict; however, the Court
indicated that this accommodation would not be considered reasonable as it still discriminated
based on religion.141 Although the Court used the term eliminate in this case, it did not establish
this as the standard to determine reasonable accommodations. The Court merely noted the
potential accommodation had the effect of eliminating the conflict. A reading of Ansonia further
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supports the notion that an employer is not required to eliminate the conflict to comply with the
Act as the Court notes that the employer is not required to give the employee a choice of
accommodations and instead is able to choose an accommodation it prefers.142 Neither
legislative history nor the statute require an employer to choose a specific accommodation.143 If
an employer was required to eliminate the conflict to comply with the Act, the Supreme Court
would not need to specify that employers retained the choice of accommodations. Finally, the
Court rejects the standard outlined by the lower court which would give an employee “every
incentive to hold out for the most beneficial accommodation, despite the fact that an employer
offers a reasonable resolution of the conflict.”144 This furthers the point that Title VII calls for
bilateral cooperation and the onus is not entirely on the employer. If the statute required
elimination, the employee would not have to wait for the most beneficial accommodation,
because all offered would end with the same result. Thus, the Supreme Court, in Ansonia, did
not determine that an accommodation must eliminate the conflict to be considered reasonable.
Similarly, in Hardison, the Court did not establish a hardline rule. The Court notes that the
EEOC did not define reasonable accommodation when amending its guidelines.145 However, it
found that, in this case, the employer made reasonable efforts to accommodate the conflict.146
The employer held several meetings with the employee during which it tried to find solutions
and also authorized the union steward to find someone to switch shifts.147 In addition, the
employer tried unsuccessfully to find him another job.148 Despite these failed attempts, the Court
found these proffered accommodations reasonable and the employer could not “be faulted for
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having failed to work out a shift or job swap” for the employee.149 The Court did not mention a
requirement to eliminate the conflict and instead focuses on the efforts of the employer to
comply with the Act and reasonably accommodate its employee. Again, the Supreme Court
analyzed whether an employer reasonably accommodated its employee within the meaning of
Title VII and did not establish a requirement to eliminate the conflict.
Numerous circuit courts have, based on a plain reading of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
an interpretation of the Supreme Court decisions, have determined that an employer needs to
reasonably accommodate an employee’s conflict without establishing a threshold of what
constitutes a reasonable accommodation. These courts analyzed the facts of individual cases to
determine whether that employer reasonably accommodated its employee’s conflict.150 In
Patterson, the court held that the employer was not required to guarantee that the employee
would never work on his Sabbath because it offered several accommodations that attempted to
reduce the likelihood he would be asked to work on his Sabbath.151 Following the guidance of
the CFR, the court noted that the employer facilitated the employee’s attempts to swap shifts, but
was not required to actively assist or ensure he could swap.152 Because the employer offered
accommodations that “enhanced the likelihood of avoiding” the conflict, it satisfied its duties
under Title VII.153 Similarly, in Sánchez-Rodriguez, the court noted the importance of
examining the totality of the circumstances, echoing the flexibility approach highlighted in
Ansonia.154 Even where the court held that determining reasonableness is for the jury to
determine, it has also noted that the standard for reasonableness does not equate to elimination.
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In Tabura, the court pointed out that Ansonia did not stand for the notion that an
“accommodation could never be reasonable if it failed totally and under every conceivable fact
scenario to eliminate every conflict or all tension.”155 Instead, the Supreme Court cases should
be interpreted as finding a reasonable accommodation when the employer completely eliminates
the conflict.156 That does not mean that the employer must eliminate the conflict to act in
accordance with the Act.157
Other courts, on the other hand, have interpreted the Supreme Court cases to impose a higher
standard on employers than what Title VII dictates. Several circuits have created a standard that
requires employers to eliminate the conflict, rather than just reasonably accommodating.158 In
Ilona of Hungary, the court cited Ansonia as the basis for requiring the employer eliminate the
conflict between the employment requirement and the religious practice.159 However, the court
did not explain how it established the standard beyond merely citing to Supreme Court cases.160
The court created a standard that neither the Supreme Court nor the statute dictates, thus
increasing the burden placed on employers to satisfy the requirements of Title VII. Similarly, in
Baker, the court cites Ilona of Hungary in finding that the employer is required to eliminate the
conflict.161 This court, however, fails to point to evidence supporting that standard, merely
equating eliminating the conflict to a reasonable accommodation, without support from either
statutory sources or case law from the Supreme Court. In Morrissette-Brown, the court notes
that Title VII does not define reasonably accommodation and thus relies on case law to
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determine the standard.162 However, the court cites Ansonia to define the standard as
eliminate.163 This analysis again relies only on the mention of the word “eliminate” by the
Supreme Court and in the context of a potential accommodation that was deemed not to be
reasonable.164 These courts interpreted a standard that, lacking both statutory and case law
support, creates a higher burden on employers than the Civil Rights Act of 1964 imposes.
Title VII demands that an employer reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious
conflict, unless it can show that doing so would impose an undue hardship on the employer.
Because neither reasonably accommodate nor undue burden is defined by the Act or the Supreme
Court, lower courts are left to determine the standards. Courts appear to be more willing to find
a reasonable accommodation imposes an undue hardship on the employer rather than finding that
the employer reasonably accommodated the employee’s religious conflict.165 However, even if
the undue hardship is an easier hurdle to clear, the Act still does not impose an obligation to
eliminate the conflict, absent an undue hardship.
V.

CONCLUSION
This note argued that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that employers

reasonably accommodate conflicts between work obligations and employees’ religious practices.
The Act, however, does not require that employers must eliminate the burden to comply.
Determining whether an employer is obligated to completely eliminate a conflict or reasonably
accommodate it has significant implications for how employers handle religious accommodation.
Title VII does not define what constitutes a reasonable accommodation and the Supreme Court
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has not clarified the term, instead mentioning possible accommodations that could be considered
reasonable. The Supreme Court denied cert to review Patterson.166 The United States filed a
brief amicus curiae and both Walgreens and Patterson filed supplemental briefs.167 In denying
cert, the Court noted “the case raises important questions about the meaning of Title VII’s
prohibition of employment discrimination.”168 The Court, however, then stated “that [Patterson]
does not present a good vehicle for revisiting Hardison.169 Thus, until the Supreme Court
clarifies further, based on a plain reading of the text of the Act and the lack of a definitive
standard provided by the Supreme Court, employers should operate under the assumption that
they are not required to eliminate the conflict, so long as they provide reasonable
accommodations to their employees.
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